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Taliban Talks - The Completion of a Defeat? 
 
In the context of the recently opened Taliban office in Doha (Qatar), and the start of talks 
between the US and political representative of the Taliban movement, the following article 
will elaborate on the difficulties attached to the so-called ‘peace negotiation’ process. The 
article contends that any agreement on power sharing will lead to political and military 
resistance, which in turn will undermine democracy and nullify all achievements regarding 
human rights and particularly women’s rights. Therefore, armed confrontation will remain 
the norm. The main argument is that the Taliban as an anti-systemic and anti-democratic 
force is trapped in its own fundamentalist ideology and, in order to keep the movement 
going, it has to reject Afghanistan’s current democratic system of governance. Because the 
Taliban’s major goal is to re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is 
absolutely incompatible with the interests of any other stakeholder in the Afghan imbroglio. 
However, in order for the US to ensure a safe withdrawal, Washington will remain ignorant 
towards this threat. In contrast, it offers the Taliban political participation which effectively 
gives them the opportunity to undermine the Afghanistan’s political system from within. In 
brief, it will complete NATO’s military defeat with a political one.  
 
NATO’s Engagement in Afghanistan: An Unfortunate Trajectory 
 
‘We will neither talk nor negotiate with the Taliban’ was the mantra of the warring factions of 
the international community, at least during the first years of their engagement in 
Afghanistan. Even mentioning the notion of direct talks with militant oppositional forces was 
more or less a political taboo. In sharp contrast, on 18 June the Taliban opened its first 
official liaison office in the Qatari capital of Doha. This is remarkable: only 12 years after 
NATO (guided by the US) caused the collapse of the fundamentalist Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan, which was in large portrayed as the ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the 
‘banned fundamentalists’ are now officially celebrating their come back on the international 
stage. The traumatic prelude to this strategically organised spectacle is well-known: The 
apparently victorious international community installed the regime of President Harmid 
Karzai who’s function was to be a US controlled governor of Kabul rather than a widely 
accepted leader of the nation, consequently former local power centres such as warlords 
and militias re-emerged. But most importantly, the short-sided and unquestioned support 
for Karzai by the US helped to pave the way for the resurrection of the Taliban and its 
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associated groups (e.g. Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Haqqani Network, and 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) as armed opposition against the international troops 
and the government of Afghanistan which is perceived as an illegitimate institution. 
Additionally, due to the opportunity of regrouping and re-strengthening within supportive 
Pakistani safe-havens, Taliban and other militant groups were subsequently able the regain 
leverage and to establish parallel shadow governments in large parts of Afghanistan. The 
following inability to vanquish the Taliban, who for more than one decade have been 
successfully operating in flexible, tactical alliances against NATO and the Afghan security 
forces, made it clear that a so-called military solution in order to stabilise the country is not 
feasible. The occurrence of failed high profile Taliban attacks, like the one on the Kabul 
International Airport on 10 June 2013 or the attack on the presidential compound and a CIA 
office on 25 June, are still exception rather than the norm. This high level of instability is 
gaining momentum since the primary focus of the efforts carried out and the invested 
financial and human resources of the international community has been and still is on 
security and much less so on political-administrative institution building, civilian 
development and local ownership.    
 
The State of Art: Causalities and Impacts 
 
The Worsening security situation and the increasing challenge of civil-military relations 
In result, the war is lost. The return on investments in the field of socio-economic 
development are pathetic (if one does not count the revenues from the drug economy), and 
the political-administrative system is paralysed by corruption and inefficiency. Furthermore, 
the institutional, political-administrative structure is getting more and more under the 
influence of Taliban and other extra-constitutional powers, primarily warlords and militias. 
Subsequently, there is a growing disillusion among the Afghans about the state of 
democracy in their country. On top of that, the core object of the development efforts, the 
build-up of a loyal and functioning army, does not seem to be achieved. This finds its 
expression is a disintegrating security sector characterised by growing rivalry and hostility 
between the different army, police and security apparatus as well as in a raising concern 
about civilian control over the armed forces. The fact that in the last months the armed 
forces booked some successes will definitely give them more confidence in their 
capabilities to deal with the Taliban – even without the support of NATO’s International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). However, this does not automatically mean that the 
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cohesion within the individual operating units as well as between the different branches of 
the security services is strengthened. If one looks at the amount of clashes between 
Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) it seems that the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are primarily occupied with fighting each other as 
opposed to working on national security. There is a tremendous number of reports on so-
called “green-on-green” incidents. In military’s jargon ‘green’ refers to the  ANSF, (and blue 
refers to the international security forces). The term ‘green-on-green attacks’ therefore 
refers to friendly fire incidences where ‘friendly’ forces are ‘accidentally’ being fired upon by 
their own ‘comrades’. The numbers of these incidences have increased worryingly. It is 
important to note that respective reports stress that many of the ‘green-on-green’ incidents 
are caused by rivalries between the different branches of service or are used as a means 
to settle disputes in the context of illegal activities of individuals or whole units. Additionally, 
the emergence of struggles for power and an increase in an institutional role between the 
different forces is particularly worrying. Combined with an increase in the number of ‘green-
on-blue’ attacks, which means that elements within the Afghan security forces attack 
US/NATO forces, this gives rise to the legitimate question how coherent and loyal 
Afghanistan’s security services are likely to be towards any government in the post-2014 
withdrawal scenario.  
Taking into account that Afghanistan also has a history of military-backed coups (for 
example Dawood Khans White Revolution which led to a suppression of all democratic 
elements in 1973 or the Saur revolution of 1978) one should remain sceptical about the 
extent in which Afghanistan civilians are able to maintain control over their soldiers. The 
Taliban return, rise of criminal networks, weak governance, corruption, and the growing 
number and strength of alternative power centres under control of warlords might be used 
as legitimization to take over power directly or to install a government that is backed or 
appointed by the military. This of cause is based on the premise that the Afghan Security 
Forces will be able to maintain a minimum degree of cohesiveness in order to contain its 
tremendous fragmentation. The case of Pakistan shows that the US don’t have any 
problems in dealing with illegitimate military governments (Ayub Khan 1958-1962, Yahya 
Khan 1962-1971, Zia-Ul-Haq 1977-1985 and Pervez Musharraf 1999-2002) as long as it 
serves their interests. Having close contacts to Afghanistan’s security forces the US, apart 
from making some diplomatic statements, would most likely not intervene.  
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Opening of the Doha Office: Realising US dreams and Taliban facts 
 
Generally speaking, the opening of the Doha office marks the present peak of a trajectory 
which is undoubtedly working in favour of the Taliban because it will help to entrench the 
Taliban as legitimate actor in Afghanistan’s political landscape. Furthermore, as an anti-
systemic force the Taliban will be most likely able to gain a significant advantage out of an 
anarchical situation in the country’s future. Having this in mind, the Taliban make no secret 
out of it that their new Doha office serves more purposes than merely acting as a meeting 
place for talks. In fact, the office is the most visible expression that the Taliban will have its 
very own agenda in the negotiation process, which will certainly follow the actual 
conversations, which will not necessarily match the prospects for Afghanistan as envisaged 
by the US, the Karzai government or the Afghan people. First of all, talking directly with the 
U.S. will help the Taliban gaining international prestige, recognition and legitimacy. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that the office will also function as a diplomatic and political site, 
as a main coordinating office of the political wing of the movement. Having the disposal of 
such a facility, the Taliban have the chance to regroup and enlarge their political 
representation and improve the efficiency of their political campaigns against the Afghan 
government. This marks a milestone in the middle-term goal to get involved in the country’s 
official affairs without having to wait until the pull-out of NATO.  
Therefore, by using the name and the banner of their old fundamentalist authoritarian 
regime for the facility’s inauguration, the Taliban carried out a tremendous propaganda 
coup by gaining a window of opportunity to demonstrate the world the fruitlessness and 
failure of NATO’s ISAF mission. All initial goals, policy directives and promises towards the 
Afghans from the governments of the international community involved seem to be either 
fluid or even invalid today. Having this in mind, one could argue that talks between the US 
and the Taliban imply an augmentation of the military debacle and developmental chaos. 
Subsequently, the Obama administration’s policy to support the opening of the Taliban 
office as a symbol of rapprochement is pretty simple and crystal clear: to ensure a safe and 
smooth pull-out of US troops while creating the image of having provided an arrangement 
for a minimum level of stability in order to safe Washington’s face and to shirk the 
responsibility for the future developments towards the Afghan government. In sum, it marks 
the most visible expression of an ‘official capitulation’ of the international community.   
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Ten reasons why talks with Taliban will not lead to stability, peace and reconciliation: 
 
Just as both the military and the reconstruction and development campaigns suffered from 
an incoherent strategy, it seems that the start of the talks with the Taliban is missing a 
concrete concept (other than organizing the troop withdrawal) too. In this context, most 
dramatic are the emerging but misleading hopes and false premises regarding the chances 
to end the war. It should be stressed that there are no indications that talks will lead to an 
end of fighting in Afghanistan. In contrast, it will rather aggravate tensions and conflicts 
which will lead to a continuation of armed confrontations. This is because of several 
reasons which will be elaborated in detail below. 
 
1. The myth of factionalism within the Taliban movement 
 
In order to end the policy of denying direct talks with the Taliban and to justify the beginning 
of them, governments involved in the Afghan imbroglio and their compliant analysts are 
trying hard to shape the public debate by introducing a notion of the existence of intra-
Taliban factionalism. In other words, the hypothesis contends that if one is able to co-opt 
one faction in the negotiation process one could split and exhaust the whole Taliban 
movement. But based on differentiation between moderate or radical, good or bad, 
pragmatic or hardline Taliban one has to understand that there is no clear evidence for 
severe divides within the Taliban. Also the notion that one has to make a clear-cut 
distinction between the Pakistani Taliban and Afghanistan Taliban seems to be highly 
artificial. However, it seems that the decision-makers in the US are trying to portray the 
Taliban as a kind of a socio-political movement. That is, an exceptional one which follows a 
much belligerent, extremist militant path: a characteristic which is generally perceived as 
atypical for socio-political movements. Nevertheless, this gives Washington the opportunity 
to refer in its rationale that the Taliban as a ‘movement’ naturally suffers from the most 
common dilemma of socio-political movements: the schism between a moderate and 
radical pole. In many cases this finds its expression in a ‘confrontational bipolarity’ between 
moderates and radicals. In line with this argumentation, this would gain particular 
momentum in the case of the Taliban because their aggressive habitus is supposed to lead 
to fragmentation and heterogeneity. 
This is a major misunderstanding. Basically, the movement consists of a relatively small 
group of highly motivated activists which functions as the ideological leadership which 
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holds together the more or less loose social base on both sides of the Durand line (the 
disputed Afghanistan-Pakistan border). Undeniably, the Taliban consists of numerous 
groups and task forces both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, with differentiation in armed 
organization, tactics and local interests. Therefore, one can state that the Taliban 
movement is not stringently organised as other political-religious movements like the 
Hindu-nationalist Sangh Parivar in India. But despite the highly decentralised character, the 
Taliban posses a discernible organizational structure based on informal personal networks 
of fighters, workers, and supporters created by reputed, charismatic leaders. These 
networks can be found on different levels: from local to district, province and national level 
up to the top leadership also called the Quetta Shura. These individual leaders, who are 
positioned on different levels within the Taliban’s ‘hierarchical order’, gather fighters and 
supporters and therefore form the scaffolding of the movement. It is important to 
understand that each of the subordinated level pays respect and obedience to the higher 
level. At the top of this hierarchical system of loyalty-based personalised structures is the 
spiritual leader, the Amir ul-Momineen (a position that will be discussed in further detail 
below) Mullah Mohammed Omar. Omar and the Pakistan based Quetta Shura, constitute 
the ideological centre and supreme authority of the movement. Additionally, this leadership 
council (besides some provincial councils) constitutes the most formal organ of the Taliban 
and is doing the top decision-making like the defining a ‘grand strategy’ how to reach the 
overall goal for the subordinated socio-political structures and networks as well as the 
military regional commands. This aim consists primarily of the establishment of a theocratic 
state based on their narrow interpretation of Islam and a truncated notion of Sharia law on 
the expense of liberal democracy based on the three democratic core values: people 
sovereignty, liberty and equality. It is important to note, that the subordinated networks 
don’t defer from this ideological directive, but follow partly individual paths and patterns 
regarding the implementation of it. Because of this, the notion that they are a loose 
conglomerate of fragmented elements has to be rejected. However, some distinctions 
which one can make are between: a) the Quetta Shura, including the subordinated leaders 
(the leadership circles), and the mass of low ranking Taliban which are more paid 
mercenaries (full-time as well as part-time fighters) than ideologically convinced activists 
like the foremost political cadres and ‘honorary Taliban’; b) various interests and/or 
pressure groups differing on issues like relationship to the Pakistani security forces, ties 
with international/trans-national jihadist groups (e.g. al-Qaeda); c) younger and older 
members, which can be interpreted as a classical generation conflict. This is not about an 
9 
ideology, it is more about the up-coming of a new generation which is gaining more 
influence and wants to climb up the hierarchy which causes a clash with the older leaders; 
d) Taliban-born or having origins in Pakistan or in Afghanistan. However, where a Taliban 
exactly comes from, Afghanistan or Pakistan, is in ideological terms no issue because by 
joining the Taliban and accepting their ideology they give up their own respective national 
identity. It is important to note here that the feeling of belonging to Pakistan or Afghanistan 
is secondary. What is more important than the national identity, which is perceived my 
Taliban as an abstract and vague concept, is idea of tribal identity and belonging. 
Especially the Pashtuns, whose tribes constitute the main recruiting base of the Taliban, 
feel closer to their common tribesmen on both sides of the border than to a respective 
nationality. This is another significant factor that proves how irrelevant the differentiation 
between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban is. Of course in regarding organisational 
structure it matters to which regional network and command they belong and as such they 
have a different leaning regarding the points made above. But one has to point out, that 
there is no evidence that such differences and clashes within the Taliban has certain 
geographical implications, in other words that they justify a clear distinction between 
Afghanistan and Pakistani Taliban.  
As already indicated above, the argument made by protagonists of the Doha talks is that 
significant cleavages within the Taliban camp do exist and is enforcing a fragmentation 
which one could use to weaken the movement. Regarding this rationale, subsequent 
factions would emerge who will turn against other parts of the movement if one just over 
enough socio-economic, and/or political benefits. But this does not match the realities on 
the ground. In contrast, members of the Taliban top brass get immediately excluded as 
soon as they try to create factions or depart from the ideological line. A prominent example 
is Mullah Agha Jan Motasim who got excluded from the central leadership after he 
promoted the creation of political structures to participate in the electoral process. There is 
no doubt that many are joining the Taliban for the sake of having an (additional) income 
and/or fighting rather a class struggle than an indoctrinated Jihad. However, this makes the 
mercenaries, bandits or outlaws who are joining the Taliban for economic reasons are not 
less dangerous and do not make the movement weaker. They follow the same order, 
implement the same goals, and use the same illegitimate, violent methods of terrorism 
against the (Afghan) people like their indoctrinated comrades. Consequently, the typical 
phenomena within movements, such as the existence of a (bi)polarity, which several 
observers artificially try to apply, do not exist in a significant degree among the Taliban. In 
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sum, there are no moderate or good, radical or moderate Taliban and despite several 
differences they are two parts of the same movement, or “two sides of the same coin”. 
 
2. Any power-sharing with Taliban will provoke resistance and armed conflict 
 
Taking into account how the opening of the Doha office got facilitated and the starting of 
talks with the Taliban were conducted; one can state that it does not matter if the 
interaction between the Taliban and the US are happening with or without the blessing of 
the Karzai administration. More concretely, a large-scale participation of the Pashtun-based 
Taliban in the Afghan government and the subordinated political-administrative structures 
will automatically incite resistance. This resistance will be especially enforced by the 
National Front of Afghanistan (NFA) or Afghanistan National Front (ANF) or Jabh-e Melli 
under the leadership of the three mighty warlords Ahmad Zia Massoud, Haji Mohammad 
Mohaqiq and Abdul Rashid Dostum, representing the three major non-Pashtun ethnic 
groups – the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. The NFA/ANF was officially founded as a 
political alliance for the next presidential elections in 2014 but will undoubtedly pull together 
their military capacities too. In their ‘Berlin-Statement’ in January 2012, the three warlords 
unambiguously stated that if the process and results of the talks are not in line with their 
interests they would not hesitate to fight against both the Taliban and the government in 
Kabul. It comes as no surprise that Dostum, Massoud and Maqiq as well as other 
influential militia commanders either maintained their former armed groups or are in the 
process of regrouping them. It is important to note that Afghanistan hardly experienced any 
situation which can be described as intra-Afghan harmony. The relationship between the 
different ethnic communities were always characterised by criss-crossing lines of mistrust 
and suspicions. The influence of external factors made the patterns of conflicts even more 
complex and tricky. Therefore, incidents like the recent failed attempt to assassinate 
Mohaqiq on 18 June will further worsen the relations between the three warlords and the 
Taliban. Without a doubt, such confrontations will create a situation which is conducive to a 
resumption of armed struggle.   
Besides the NFA/ANF, opposition will also come from the civil society and especially from 
Afghan women. The on-going massive harassment of female politicians and NGO workers 
like the ones of the Jalal Foundation of former Minister for Women Affairs (2004-2006) and 
the only female candidate in the Afghan presidential election in 2004, Dr. Massouda Jalal, 
is most likely to increase. This is because the Taliban will continue to suppress critical 
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voices from the country’s civil society. Needless to say, a growing influence of the Taliban 
over judicial and social affairs as well as education will eradicate all achievements towards 
the improvement of Afghanistan’s female citizenry. Therefore, it will be very unlikely that 
there will be much public (voluntary) support for reconciliation with and integration of 
Taliban in non-Pashtun areas. However, even if the civil society is weak and do not have 
many resources at their disposal they have given birth to numerous pro-democratic 
elements which will try to put up a political struggle to defend the constitution, especially 
the guaranteed rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, the question remains how much 
chance they have to stand up against a mighty enemy like the Taliban, especially if they 
receive support from defect democracies like Pakistan or autocratic theocracies like Iran.   
Finally, resistance or at least support for an anti-Taliban coalition in Afghanistan might also 
come from rival groups in Pakistan. The latest attack by Lashkar-e-Toiba, Ansar-ul-Islam 
and other anti-Taliban factions against the Taliban in Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Taliban 
Pakistan/TTP) in the border area with Afghanistan underpins the explosive nature of the 
situation if the Taliban get a share in the government in Kabul. It is important to note, that 
the Taliban has save havens on both sides of the borders. Which one gets used and by 
whom actually depends on the persistently changing alliances and the primary military 
targets. However, since the Taliban who are operating in Pakistan receive shelter in, for 
example, the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, the country’s anti-Taliban forces 
might be allured or even encouraged by the Pakistan’s security forces to cross into 
Afghanistan since everything beyond the Durand Line is be out of the reach of the 
Pakistani army. This would not only mean that anti-Taliban related violence is growing but 
also that pro-Pakistan groups are getting openly involved in anti-Afghan government 
action. Beside the fact that the Taliban are increasingly under pressure, they are also able 
to benefit much from such a situation since the Afghan government is forced to react to 
such a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a result a further increase of 
hostility between Afghanistan and Pakistan could appear as well as a deepening of 
Taliban’s entrenchment into the Afghan political-administrative system.   
 
3. The Taliban movement is anti-democratic and anti-systemic in nature 
 
There are no doubts that the Taliban categorically reject democracy, negotiations, and 
especially consensus-based political decision-making. In other words, deliberative political 
processes which require finding of compromises and making of exceptions are out of the 
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scope of a fundamentalist Taliban mind-set. Thinking and acting based on extremist 
ideologies do not allow any room for dissensions because disagreements and disputes, 
which are inherent to the democratic process, are seen as a threat that can weaken the 
power and efficiency of the ideology that holds the Taliban together. Therefore, democratic 
contestation would deteriorate the movement’s coherence and give room for fragmentation. 
Hence, it is in the nature and a matter of survival for the Taliban to fight democracy. 
In this context one has to state that regarding their socio-political worldview, a system to 
organise human co-existence must not only be based on Sharia law but also structured by 
a strictly entrenched ‘leader's principle’ as it was during the Taliban regime of the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001). In this form of governance all significant decision-
making is centralised in the position of the Amir ul-Momineen (or commander/leader of the 
faithful). Needless to say, the concept of a religiously legitimated Amir ul-Momineen as the 
country’s highest authority recognizes neither general elections nor an elected government 
with a (secular) head of state. It is important to note that the idea of Amir ul-Momineen as 
supreme power is not restricted to a particular nation, people or state. Rather, it provides 
for pan-Islamic nation building and identity construction. For example, the Amir ul-
Momineen Mullah Mohammad Omar sees himself not as a spiritual leader of the Afghan or 
Pakistan Taliban, he rather identifies himself as head of the whole Taliban movement which 
does not geographically limit itself to the ‘AfPak’-region only. Even if Taliban spokesmen 
deny that their activities are only focused on Pakistan and Afghanistan, ideology and 
recruitment patterns do not reflect these claims.     
Therefore, the movement’s operational aim is to end any democratic system in Islamic 
societies by all means. In other words, not only the Taliban operating in Pakistan want to 
diminish all democratic structures, but the Taliban in Afghanistan too follow the same 
agenda. If not, the ‘Pakistani Taliban’ will make sure that the ‘Afghan Taliban’ will not forget 
the overall goal of establishing region-wide Sharia law. Having this in mind, regarding their 
own logic, they can’t share power with ‘infidels’ (meaning everybody who does not adhere 
to their reading of the Koran and oppose strict implementation of the Sharia) or seriously 
participate in democracy (the ‘system of infidels’) without undermining their own collective 
identity. Due to their relatively loose network of individual factions, it is most important to 
keep their basic codes (building blocks) of identity construction functioning. Otherwise they 
would deconstruct their own ideological base and collective identity; consequently, they 
would lose the glue of their whole movement and fall apart in a bunch of unorganised 
(extremists) elements. Therefore, they do not only oppose democracy but also identify it as 
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an existential threat because this system’s norms and provide for diverging opinions. As 
such it would allow the opportunity to question Taliban ideology. This undoubtedly marks an 
existential problem for the Taliban since their ideological foundation requires absolute 
adherence from the whole Muslim community. In sum, in order to maintain its own identity 
and to hold the movement together, and as such to survive, and not being absorbed by 
other extremist groups, the Taliban have to erase all structures and agents of democracy in 
their area of influence and beyond.  
For the very same reason the Taliban will not stop at the border of Afghanistan or Pakistan. 
Since the aim is to establish Sharia law in all Muslim societies, it is very likely that they 
extend their operations beyond the ‘AfPak region.’ The statement that the Taliban are only 
interested in Pakistan and Afghanistan might reflect the current interest of the West, but 
definitely based in a misunderstanding or ignorance of Taliban ideology. Taliban are 
fundamentalists who apply a universalistic ‘catch all’ approach. In this direction one could 
even make the argument that the Taliban are more dangerous than al-Qaeda, at least in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Where al-Qaeda content themself with sporadic attacks on 
symbols and significant icons and representatives of the hostile Western world, 
predominantly the US, the Taliban is attacking the roots, structures and, most worryingly, 
the normative foundations of whole societies to carry out a total transformation and 
subsequently elimination of its enemies. In this context, one must state that obviously the 
described threat perception above refers purely to the ‘AfPak’ region, since at the moment 
this is the main area of Taliban activities. However, in other world regions which are 
suffering from terrorism, al-Qaeda with their local Jihadi alliances (e.g. Ansar Dine in Mali, 
Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen) determine the greater challenge.   
Nevertheless, in the face of all logic, it seems that the current US leadership owns a quite 
selective memory. As it stands, the Doha negotiation process will most likely lead to the 
partial integration of the Taliban into the Afghan government. But the crux of the matter is 
(besides the fact that the Taliban will get imposed on the system by the Obama 
administration and probably without being elected by the Afghan people) that the Taliban 
rather interpret the ‘talks’ as a broadening of the armed struggle than a ‘peace negotiation’. 
In brief, talks are seen as an extension of their activities into the political arena. In other 
words, through ‘Doha’ they will get an additional opportunity to undermine Afghanistan’s 
democracy from within. To sum up, allowing the Taliban to participate in Afghanistan 
political-administrative structure is like “doing not only a pact with hypocrisy but also with 
the devil in order to set the Wolf to guard the sheep”.  
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4. The contradiction of reliability and fundamentalism  
 
Looking at the development of the numerous talk initiatives as well as subsequent 
agreements and their ‘implementation’ it is legitimate to question the credibility of Taliban 
commitments. The example of Pakistan shows the unreliability of the Taliban who have 
repeatedly reneged on peace agreements with the Pakistani army. Taking into account that 
the Taliban are actually continuing their attacks besides getting the chance to open an 
office indicates that the current and future negotiation partners of the Taliban will have a 
similar negative experience. Instead of starting with confidence building measures the 
Taliban responded by intensifying their attacks on Afghan and foreign forces. The fact that 
this coincided with the official handover of the full security responsibilities from the 
international forces to the Afghan authorities gives ample proof of the fact that the Taliban 
are not interested in any political reconciliation and integration. Instead, forced assimilation, 
humiliation, oppression and elimination continue to be the main the strategies of the 
Taliban in areas under their control. In result, besides the fact that the Taliban are not 
seriously interested in peace, this deep mistrust will definitely function as an additional 
major roadblock regarding the achievement at least of a future ‘non-war’ scenario in 
Afghanistan.  
 
5. The ‘dual approach’: Combining political and military struggle 
 
As already pointed out above, there is no conflict between pragmatists, primarily from the 
‘political wing’, and hardliners from the military leadership. The pragmatists will continue 
what they do best in order to achieve the movement goals – fighting at the political front to 
undermine the political system from within. Having been banned by the international 
community for a long time, the Doha office has given the Taliban an important platform to 
gain international legitimacy and acceptance as an actor in its own rights not only towards 
the west but also within the ‘whole Islamic world’. For, Qatar is not only a US ally but also 
an actor which tries to establish itself as a patron and promoter of all kinds of Islamic 
movements.  The Taliban’s enhanced standing will undoubtedly go at the expense of the 
Karzai government’s reputation because it has essentially been reduced to an unnecessary 
appendix in the whole process of finding a settlement. In addition to the, the Doha office 
gives the political wing of the Taliban with many more opportunities to challenge the Afghan 
state than before.  
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However, using political instruments does not mean that the military wing will stop their 
armed operations against the Afghan state and its people as well as the remaining foreign 
troops. Consequently, the democratic forces in the country will probably have to deal with 
two kinds of warfare: a political and a military one. The statement that there are serious 
grievances between ‘two camps’ (pragmatists vs. hardliners) is artificially made in order to 
create false prospects of realistic opportunities for talks. This is a negligent 
misrepresentation. The Taliban will use the Doha talks to achieve results, which will enable 
them to implement a ‘dual approach’ in order to intensify the conflict. Therefore, the 
Taliban’s ‘strategic worldview’ is simple and clear: either you try to re-establish the Islamic 
Emirate through ‘words’ or by ‘guns’ – or both.  
 
6. The US and Afghan government do not operate from a position of strength.  
 
Due to the fact that much of the US resources were bounded in Iraq and some ominous 
strategic decisions that contributed much to the unfortunate course of the war, the military 
situation in Afghanistan can be best described as a stalemate. This is well portrayed by the 
extraordinary raise in Taliban attacks over the last years and the subsequent noticeable 
deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan. Regarding the Afghanistan NGO 
Safety Office, attacks by the Taliban and associated groups in the first quarter of 2013 went 
up 46% compared to the same period in 2012. A similar dramatic increase in militant 
attacks was recorded by ISAF, stating that Afghanistan witnessed twice as many incidents 
compared to 2008 before NATO significantly built-up its troop level. In this context, one 
should mention that the Taliban became not only in militarily but also economically much 
stronger. This is not only because of the growing production and trade of narcotics which is 
largely controlled by the militants, but also because they were able to participate and gain 
benefits from the country’s regular economy via ‘straw men’. Important in this direction is 
that Afghan companies and especially those that operate in Taliban controlled have to pay 
‘taxes’ to the Taliban in order to steer clear of Taliban attacks. Levies on general trade and 
agricultural production form one of the most important sources of revenue for the Taliban. 
On top of these internal sources of financing, there is also large scale external support 
from countries like Pakistan and Iran. There will be most likely no chance in the foreign 
policies in this direction despite the election in both countries. In Pakistan the army as well 
as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and in Iran the country’s leading clergy will most 
likely not stop their support for the Taliban as long as they identify common goals beyond 
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the Shia-Sunni divide. In this context, the opening of the Doha office will help the Taliban to 
gain more popularity among internal state and non-state actors willing to support and 
finance militant extremists. This in turn will increase chances to successfully attract more 
financial resources. In addition, there are several other domestic factors contributing to the 
expansion of the Taliban’s might: they were able to catch many of the unemployed, 
disenfranchised, frustrated youth in remote rural areas which get recruited and 
indoctrinated in large numbers. Also the Taliban were able to convince many tribal elders to 
join the movement which gave them access to the villages. Of course, the elders were 
eventually side-lined or killed. This is a recurring strategy of the Taliban to gain foothold in 
Pakistan’s FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). However, it also helped either to co-
opt the anti-Taliban clergy or to eliminate them like the tribal elders. Finally, by having 
access to the villages the Taliban were able to create another ‘inroad’ into local Afghan 
communities: via arranged and forced marriages.    
These are all worrying developments because the US as the prime negotiator has nothing 
really to offer to the Taliban to make them stop their aggressive ‘forward policy’ besides 
putting pressure on the Afghan government to share power and to exchange prisoners. 
The Afghan government, which is evidently the weakest actor in the whole  process has 
most likely just a ‘rubber-stamp-function,’ i.e. to provide official Afghan legitimacy for 
potential upcoming negotiations and arrangements. Last but not least, one must mention 
that there is no need for the Taliban to offer clear proposals by addressing the demands of 
the international community, to strike an actual deal, as well as to keep one own words. 
With the increase in economic and military power the Taliban were also gaining more 
confidence over the last view years. Today, the Taliban are convinced that they are capable 
of overcoming any challenge from NATO. 
 
7. Worrying scope of Taliban interests  
 
There are no doubts in the current debate on the Doha talks that the Taliban are interested 
in gaining political influence in Afghanistan. But what is largely ignored is that regarding 
their ideology, the Taliban can’t be satisfied with ‘just’ controlling Kabul. In other words, it is 
in the nature of the Taliban to look beyond the Afghan soil. If they have the opportunity they 
will not restrict themselves to Afghanistan. In this context, one can state that the Taliban’s 
promise not to use Afghan territory to create threats to any other country is not plausible 
regarding their mind-set. There is no doubt that they will have no problem to distance 
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themselves from international terrorism and even might agree to give a statement that they 
distance themselves from al-Qaeda: dropping the notion of carrying out terrorist activities 
means just giving up on one instrument out of many. But distancing from one instrument 
does not imply that the Taliban abandon their goals. Therefore the US must be aware, that 
is not the path in which the Taliban attempt to achieve their aim but the aims as such 
constitutes the real threat for the region as well as the international community.  
 
8. The Taliban are already a ‘state within the state’ in waiting 
 
Over the last decade the Taliban were able to establish parallel structures in large parts of 
Afghanistan. This is done by specialist political-administrative cadres like ‘preachers’ 
responsible for spreading ideas and carrying out propaganda and spy tasks across the 
country and ‘agents’ in charge of recruitment and building up networks and structures. The 
latter is usually done through the ‘appointment’ of ‘shadow’ governors, judges, tax 
collectors, establishing (communication) networks for supply of food, accommodation etc. – 
all to challenge the authority of the state in the periphery. In many cases, they are able to 
co-opt local strongmen, and (community) militias to support the Taliban movement with 
men power. Furthermore, the ‘agents’ or ‘Taliban commissars’ were also able to arrange 
deals with the security forces (especially police) either to get indirect their support or able 
to convince them to defect directly to the Taliban camp. According to some reports, the 
Taliban claim that they can draw on at least 100.000 rank-and-files of all different types, 
which sounds actually more like a publicity coup than a real figure. Nevertheless, at the 
very least it gives a basic idea of the envisaged manpower which the Taliban want to build-
up for the post-2014 scenario. Besides the fact that the persistently growing ‘shadow state’ 
of the Taliban is seriously undermining the already endemic corrupt and inefficient state 
institutions, it gains special attention since Taliban ‘agents’ and ‘preachers’ are not only 
identifying supporters but opponents too, which are either eliminated or forcefully 
assimilated. Additionally, having the support of the military wing, political cadres of the 
Taliban get usually not harassed by carrying out their activities. The (political) pro-
democracy forces and civil society organizations are seriously hampered in their work and 
daily lives which means that the already unfair competition between the Taliban and non-
Taliban groups is likely to get even worse after the pull-out of foreign troops and a potential 
power-sharing with the Taliban. However, one of the most interesting findings in this 
context is: the Taliban are able to re-establish their influence and power in areas in which 
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they lost their control despite the presence of NATO troops in the country and the build-up 
of Afghanistan’s security forces.  Furthermore, the process of re-establishing the Taliban’s 
Islamic order has already begun in the areas that are under their reign.  
 
9. The post-2014 residual force conundrum 
 
There will be no complete withdrawal of foreign forces of the around 100.000 troops from 
48 involved countries (including 66.000 US troops), as demanded by Taliban and 
associated extremists. How many forces NATO will leave in the troubled country behind 
and if these are only going to operate as trainers and advisors is questionable. Despite 
some current successes, one must remain sceptical about the ability of the Afghan security 
forces to ensure a necessary minimum of security in order to maintain at least the status 
quo for the political-administrative system. The fact that the US is likely to keep a 
substantial troop level and retain military bases on strategically important areas in the 
country will also be a source for future armed confrontations. There are too many 
geopolitical interests attached to the Afghanistan engagement, which are going far beyond 
destroying al-Qaeda, ousting the Taliban, or taking care of the well-being of the Afghan 
people and their system of governance. Strategic interests regarding monitoring hostile 
Iran as well as ambitious and forceful expending China, and keeping an eye on Central 
Asia’s vast natural resources are enough arguments for the major non-regional players to 
stay engaged in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Doha talks will not mark an ‘End-Game’ 
towards peace and reconciliation but probably set conditions for a continuation of political 
instability and political instability. In the unlikely event that the Taliban leadership accept 
any presence of foreign troops this would mean that they forfeit their raison d’être and 
everything they have struggled for. Undoubtedly, this would have a disastrous effect on 
internal cohesion of the movement. The central leadership would lose credibility in front of 
their sub-ordinated rank-and-files and also affect recruiting processes negatively as well as 
fund raising processes among the international donors of jihadist activities.  
 
10. Taliban belief of being the only legitimate ruler of Afghanistan 
 
Today, the Taliban portray the US concession to maintain an office in Doha as a victory but 
also as a significant step towards the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan. Portraying the NATO engagement as a continuation of the Soviet occupation, 
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Taliban officials are making no secret out of the fact that they feel ousted by an undue 
‘foreign hand’. Therefore the Taliban continue to perceive themselves as the only 
organisation that can make a legitimate claim to government power in Kabul. The fact that 
the US arranged for President Karzai to form the government and to stay in power under 
massive truncation of all democratic norms, values and procedures, is playing into the 
hands of the preachers of Taliban ideology. Therefore, the use of the Taliban flag, anthem 
and the name “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” leave no doubts about that the Taliban are 
still following their strict radical idea of establishing its terror regime in Afghanistan based 
on their own interpretation of Islam and religious Islamic codes. This also means that they 
will do anything to end the democratic project in the country and revoke all socio-political 
achievement of the female citizenry. It will also be just a matter of time, until the 
rudimentary elements of Afghanistan’s civil society will be totally eroded. It is a process 
which started already some years ago trough massive harassments and target killings of 
NGOs, activists, and journalists who were all presenting alternatives to the Taliban’s 
worldview. It is interesting to note, that Pakistan offers some indications for a potential 
Afghan future. Despite the fact that Pakistan’s judiciary is getting stronger and more 
independent compared to other state institutions, it shows also a disturbingly high level of 
ignorance towards religious radicalism and militancy and an unwillingness to intervene. For 
example, the inactivity of the country’s judiciary when it comes to the repressive blasphemy 
laws and the protection of the religious minorities or the active support for religious 
conservatives notions (e.g. internet censorship in 2010 which led to the blocking of 
numerous online based social networks, including Facebook and YouTube in 2010) proves 
how easy it is for fundamentalists to gain influence over the state institutions. But until the 
aim of Taliban state is not achieved, being a stakeholder in a democratic system is not an 




It seems that the Obama administration either did not learn much about its enemy during 
the last twelve years of fighting, or they just ignore out of a matter of convenience how the 
Taliban function, and what their goals and intentions are. The Taliban are neither amenable 
for peace nor willing to compromise on their radical ideology and deeply held beliefs. 
Political accommodation and consensus politics are alien concepts to them. But a multi-
ethnic state like Afghanistan -with its strong decentralised power structures- can only 
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function when the respective national and regional leadership circles have the political 
skills and capacities to work out a ‘balance of power’ that is satisfying to all major actors 
involved. However, there are no indications that the Taliban are interested to take on this 
task and will follow any deal they agreed on. Especially the US should know that one can’t 
trust talks with the Taliban. Not only the Pakistani Taliban have the habit of not sticking to 
agreements. The initial denying of the fact that the Taliban were hosting Bin Laden and the 
myth that they were not maintaining terrorist training camps after the took over power in 
Kabul in the late 1990s as well as that they are interested in good relations with US can be 
seen as a proof thereof. Having this in mind, the pledge not to use Afghanistan as a base 
to threaten other countries is probably merely a rhetoric manoeuvre.    
To sum up, the talks will not lead to peace and stability in Afghanistan. Instead, it marks the 
defeat of the international community and the nullifying of all grand goals like the 
establishment of a stable democratic order, and dashes hopes of the Afghan people for 
more political and civil rights and improved socio-economic leaving conditions. It also 
marks the return of the Taliban, their international and local rehabilitation and the 
legitimised entrance into the political system of Afghanistan. Consequently, the pro-
democratic forces in Afghanistan will have to defend the achievements on two fronts: on 
the military front by facing the much stronger Taliban forces and, second, on the political 
front by having to struggle with the Taliban which after a power sharing agreement will have 
the chance to deconstruct the political-administrative system from within by gradually 
overtaking ministries and other state institutions. Therefore, it will be only a matter of time 
until the ‘vivisection’ of the constitution will begin. However, the anti-Taliban forces 
especially the NFA/ANF will not accept the hand-over of substantial resources and power 
of the state towards the Taliban. Therefore, the militant, non-state anti-Taliban forces are 
already preparing militarily for the post-withdrawal scenario. The Taliban will not give in to 
the US demand to disarm and will continue fighting. The fact that Taliban did not stop this 
year’s “Spring Offensive” despite getting an office and the start of talks is a sign that armed 
conflicts are remaining the norm rather than the exception in Afghanistan. To sum up, the 
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